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Hypothesis and Community 
 
Abstract 
 
If we accept that the method of experimental natural science operates within the milieu of 
hypothetical cause and effect categorical judgement, then the question may be asked 
whether wissenschaftlich thought (ie “scientific” thought more broadly defined than is usual 
in the English use of this word) exists only within this milieu.  This paper will approach this 
question via the table of categories in Kant’s first critique (B106) where, in the third part “Of 
Relation”, he makes a distinction between relations “Of Causality and Dependence (cause 
and effect)” and those “Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient) [der 
Gemeinschaft – Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Handelnden und Leidenden]”.  In Kant’s 
transcendental method, each category is related back to functions of judgement, likewise 
outlined in a table (B95) (a table which Kant says he will “place before the eyes” - vor Augen 
stellen).   The category of cause and effect is related to hypothetical judgement; the 
category of community is related to disjunctive judgement. 
 
The link between the category of community and disjunctive judgement is complex, Kant 
says, and he goes on to give a succinct and useful analysis of them: 
  Now in a whole which is made up of things…. one thing is not subordinated, as 
effect, to another, as cause if its existence, but, simultaneously and reciprocally, is 
co-ordinated with it, as cause of the determination of the other…. This is quite a 
different kind of connection from that which is found in the mere relation [blossen 
Verhaeltnis ] of cause and effect… for in the latter relation the consequence does not 
in its turn reciprocally determine the ground 
 
The paper will: 
 
•  compare this Kantian classical duality between “cause and effect” and “community” 
with Deleuze’s championing of the stoic logic of cause and effect which (as he says 
in the second series of Logic of Sense) brings about “an entirely new cleavage of 
the causal relation” 
•  posit that architectural experimentation is destined to occur within the milieu of 
reciprocity rather than that of hypothesis, and indicate the possible implications of 
this 
 
 
 
Gilles Deleuze announces in the preface to Logic of Sense that he is writing, or will write, 
not a philosophy, but a novel
1.  The a-logic of the preface
2 is at work here; at once inside 
and outside the book itself, the preface as it were thickens the boarder between the inside 
and the outside of the work and at the same time complicates it in semi-reflexive manner by 
referring to the whole thing (“the book”) of which it itself, as preface, both is and is not a 
part.  Does, therefore, the “novel” which Deleuze announces that this book will be, include 
or not include a preface which itself announces that the novel will be a novel?  Or shall we 
say (to raise the level – and it is all about the issue of logical levels, or, to use Russell’s 
terminology, the issue of types
3: how will the paradox of types be resolved?) that a novel is 
rather that device, that machine, which begins to put this question into play; a device for 
creating the event of this issue? 
 
                                             
1 “This book [Logic of Sense] is an attempt to develop a logical and psychological novel”.  Gilles Deleuze, Logic of 
Sense, xiv 
2 for which (in the context of architecture) see in particular Jacques Derrida’s Parergon in The Truth in Painting; but 
then the paradox of the preface, of the thick boarder, of the issue as to the start or beginning (thus origin) of the 
work, is present throughout the whole of his work 
3 see Bertand Russell, Mathematical Logic as based on a Theory of Types, 1908 (in Logic and Knowledge) Hypothesis and Community a paper by Tim Gough 
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Later, within the body of Deleuze’s “novel” itself
4, we find this definition of the novel:  
 
  There is always a great deal of art involved in the grouping of symptoms, in the 
organisation of a table where a particular symptom is dissociated from another, 
juxtaposed to a third, and forms the new figure of a disorder or illness.  Clinicians 
who are able to renew a symptomatological table produce a work of art…  It seems, 
moreover, that an evaluation of symptoms might be achieved only through a novel.
5 
 
Now we could say that Kant, in his first critique, plays this role of the novelist or clinician 
who casts for us a new table - or in this case, an interconnected pair of tables - where the 
“symptoms” of pure concepts of the understanding [reinen Verstandesbegriffe] are laid out 
for us, presented or re-presented to us, or put before our eyes  - “vor Augen stellen”
6.  This 
is done within the context of Kant’s transcendental logic [Der transzendentalen Logik], 
forming the second part of the first book of the critique.  What is this strange thing, the 
transcendental?  Kant has already defined it: 
 
 I  entitle  transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as 
with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to 
be possible a priori.
7 
 
[Ich nenne alle Erkenntnis transzendental, die sich nicht sowohl mit Gegenstaenden, 
sondern mit unserer Erkenntnisart von Gegenstaenden, insofern diese a priori 
moeglich sein soll, ueberhaupt beschaeftigt.] 
 
and he has particularly drawn our attention to it by remarking that the awareness of the 
nature of the transcendental “extends its influence over all that follows”
8 [die ihren Einfluss 
auf alle nachfolgenden Betrachtungen erstreckt, und die man wohl vor Augen haben muss] – 
something which we must keep well and constantly before our eyes.  We find here in the 
structure of the transcendental not a linear logic
9, but rather a reflexive logic whereby 
knowledge is called upon not to march forward, nor to discover or recall that which lies 
beyond; but rather to turn back in a reflexive and reflective movement towards itself and 
consider itself, as knowledge and specifically as a priori knowledge.  In this turning back of 
knowledge upon itself, knowledge will gain knowledge of grounding knowledge, of the a 
priori. 
 
In setting out the pure concepts of the understanding [reinen Verstandesbegriffe] Kant 
operates - or gives himself to operate -  according to a single grounding principle [ihre 
Begriffe nach einem Prinzip aufzusuchen] in order to ensure that this list or table of these 
concepts (or categories) is not merely cobbled together -  as had previously been the case in 
philosophy, for instance with Aristotle: 
 
  For these concepts spring, pure and unmixed, out of the understanding which is an 
absolute unity; and must therefore be connected with each other according to one 
concept or idea.
10 
 
  [weil sie aus dem Verstande, als absoluter Einheit, rein und unvermischt entspringen, 
und daher selbst nach einem Begriffe, oder Idee, unter sich zusammenhaegen 
muessen] 
 
4 again, another a-logic, this time of the definition of the thing included within the thing which is being defined.  The 
a-logic of the preface and the mise-en-abyme (to use Derrida’s terminology) of the definition-internal-to-that-defined 
are both paradoxes analysed by Russell and resolved by means of the theory of types, which merely states that we 
“should not” set up situations where this paradoxes can arise.  These too Russellian sets of paradoxes (or types of 
nonsense) are analysed by Deleuze in the eleventh series of Logic of Sense 
5 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 237.  The emphasis is Deleuze’s 
6 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans NK Smith, 106.  Kritik der reinen Vernunft  B94. 
7 op cit, 59. A11/B25 
8 op cit, 96.  A56/B80 
9 ie, not a logic that would respect the theory of types 
10 op cit, 104.  A67/B92 Hypothesis and Community a paper by Tim Gough 
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What, then, is this one concept or idea around which all hangs?  What is the grounding 
principle which will allow Kant to draw up the table in unequivocal and definitive fashion?  -  
nothing less, we may say, than the idea and function of unity, or the one, itself.  Again, it 
seems, a strange logic: Kant requires “a single principle” [einem Prinzip], a principle of unity 
which will allow him to give us the categories of understanding; and this principle of unity 
will be the function of unity as we find it in the understanding.  Philosophy requires unity; 
and will be given unity by means of – unity.  It seems that here, that which is to do the 
grounding is already implicated in that which is to be grounded.
11 
 
The function of unity of the understanding is that by means of which things are brought 
together in judgements which create a unity amongst concepts and things.  Kant therefore 
merely needs to describe the different types of judgement in order to outline his table, which 
we can set before our eyes as follows
12: 
                                     1 
                         Quantity of judgements 
                                Universal 
                                Particular 
                                Singular 
                      2                           3 
                    Quality                   Relation 
                  Affirmative                Categorical 
                  Negative                   Hypothetical 
                  Infinite                      Disjunctive 
                                    4 
                                 Modality 
                               Problematical 
                               Assertorical 
                               Apodeictical 
 
 
  1.  Quantitaet der Urteile 
                           Allgemeine 
                           Besondere 
                           Einzelne 
 
             2. Qualitaet            3. Relation 
                    Bejahende                Kategorische 
                   Verneinende             Hypothetische 
                    Unendliche               Disjunktive 
 
                      4. Modalitaet 
                                 Problematische 
                                    Assertorische 
                                    Apodiktische 
 
 
Now this table of judgement Kant can use to establish a rigorous table of categories.  Whilst 
the table of judgement outlines the means of unifying representations in judgements, the 
table of categories outlines how our intuitions [Anschauungen] are unified.  This table 
follows precisely in its form the table of judgement, because they both use the same unifying 
 
11 again, as implied by Russell’s theory of types.  Kant wishes to grant us good, common sense.  In order to do this, 
he must, perforce, remain outside the field of good, common sense; that is, outside the good , single direction 
(sens) implied by sense.  Thus at key moments in his critique, he must do, implicitly and more or less illicitly, what 
Deleuze tells us that Carol is doing in Alice through the looking glass, and which Deleuze himself expends his book 
elucidating; namely, production of (good) sense from the movement and force of nonsense.  (See especially series 
12 of Logic of Sense.) 
12 Kant, op cit, 107, A70/B95 Hypothesis and Community a paper by Tim Gough 
 
 
page 4 of 7 
                                            
function of judgement in the understanding.  The table of categories can be laid before our 
eyes as follows
13: 
 
               1 Of Quantity       2 Of Quality 
              Unity                      Reality 
              Plurality                  Negation 
              Totality                   Limitation 
 
 3  Of Relation 
   Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens) 
   Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect) 
     Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient) 
 
4  Of Modality 
Possibility--Impossibility 
Existence--Non-existence 
Necessity--Contingence 
 
 
               1. Der Quantitaet: 
                        Einheit 
                        Vielheit 
                       Allheit. 
 
    2. Der Qualitaet:        3. Der Relation: 
        Realitaet               der Inhaerenz und Subsistenz(substantia et accidens) 
        Negation               der Kausalitaet und Dependenz (Ursache und Wirkung) 
        Limitation             der Gemeinschaft (Wechselwirkung 
                                  zwischen dem Handelnden und Leidenden). 
  
                4. Der Modalitaet 
                     Moeglichkeit - Unmoeglichkeit 
                     Dasein - Nichtsein 
                     Notwendigkeit - Zufaelligkeit. 
 
I wish to focus here particularly on the category of relation.  As we can see, Kant makes a 
distinction - according with the logic of the function of unity - within the category of relation, 
between the relation of cause and effect [Ursache und Wirkung – in the table of categories] 
and the relation of Community [der Gemeinschaft], which he characterises as the reciprocity 
between agent and patient [Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Handelnden und Leidenden].  
These two distinctions in the table of categories coincide with the distinction between on the 
one hand hypothetical judgements and on the other disjunctive judgements in the preceding 
table of judgements.  Hypothetical [Hypothetische] judgements are those which relate to the 
categories of cause and effect; disjunctive [Disjunktive] judgements are those which relate to 
the category of community. 
 
This connection, however, is more difficult to grasp than those between the other elements 
of the tables: 
  In the case of the category of community, its accordance with the form of a 
disjunctive judgment… is not as evident as in the case of the other judgments.  To 
gain assurance that they do actually accord, we must observe that in all disjunctive 
judgments the sphere (that is, the multiplicity which is contained in any one 
judgment) is represented as a whole divided into parts, and that since no one of 
them can be contained under any other, they are thought as co-ordinated with, not 
subordinated to, each other, and so as determining each other, not in one direction 
only, as in a series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate….  Now in a whole which 
 
13 op cit, 113 A80/B106 Hypothesis and Community a paper by Tim Gough 
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is made up of things, a similar combination is being thought; for one thing is not 
subordinated, as effect, to another, as cause of its existence, but, simultaneously 
and reciprocally, is co-ordinated with it, as cause of the determination of the 
other….. This is a quite different kind of connection from that which is found in the 
mere relation of cause to effect (of ground to consequence), for in the latter 
relation the consequence does not in its turn reciprocally determine the ground, 
and therefore does not constitute with it a whole – thus the world, for instance, 
does not with its Creator serve to constitute a whole.
14 (my emphasis) 
 
  [Von einer einzigen Kategorie, naemich der der Gemeinschaft, die unter dem dritten 
Titel befindlich ist, ist die Uebereinstimmung mit der in der Tafel der Logischen 
Funktionen ihm korrespondierenden Form eines disjunktiven Urteils nicht so in die 
Augen fallend, als bei den uebrigen. 
  Um sich dieser Uebereinstimmung zu versichern, muss man bemerken: dass in allen 
disjunktiven Urteilen die Sphaere (die Menge alles dessen, was unter ihm enthalten 
ist) als ein Ganzes in Teile (die untergeordneten Begriffe) geteilt vorgestellt wird, 
und, weil einer nicht unter dem anderen enthalten sein kann, sie als einander 
koordiniert, nicht subordiniert, so dass sie einander nicht einseitig, wie in einer 
Reihe, sondern wechselseitig, wie in einem Aggregat, bestimmen (wenn ein Glied 
der Einteilung gesetzt wird, alle uebrige ausgeschlossen werden, und so 
umgekehrt), gedacht werden. 
  Nun wird eine aehnliche Verknuepfung in einem Ganzen der Dinge gedacht, da 
nicht eines, als Wirkung, dem anderen, als Ursache seines Daseins, untergeordnet, 
sondern zugleich und wechselseitig als Ursache in Ansehung der Bestimmung der 
anderen beigeordnet wird, (z.B. in einem Koerper, dessen Teile einander 
wechselseitig ziehen, und auch widerstehen,) welches eine ganz andere Art der 
Verknuepfung ist, als die, so im blo￿n Verhaetnis der Ursache zur Wirkung (des 
Grundes zur Folge) angetroffen wird, in welchem die Folge nicht wechselseitig 
wiederum den Grund bestimmt, und darum mit diesem (wie der Weltschoepfer mit 
der Welt) nicht ein Ganzes ausmacht.] 
 
Having drawn, with Kant, the distinction between these two types of judgement – 
hypothetical and disjunctive – and these two types of categorical relation – cause and effect 
and reciprocity – we are in a position to frame a series of questions about what the nature of 
experimentation within the discipline of architecture might be, and how this might relate to 
either the natural sciences or other realms of endeavour where experimentation occurs.  If 
we accept that the method of experimental natural science operates within the milieu of 
hypothetical cause and effect categorical judgement, then, having had Kant’s table laid out 
for us, the question may be asked whether wissenschaftlich thought (ie “scientific” thought 
more broadly defined than is usual in the English use of this word) exists only within this 
milieu. 
 
In particular, we should note the implications of Kant’s statement about the relationship 
between the World and its creator [der Weltschoepfer].  This relationship is one of cause and 
effect.  It is such a relation because there is a simple, single and direct movement between 
the Creator and what he creates.  There is, to use terminology from the eleventh series of 
Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, the good sense (or direction – sens in French) of a movement from 
the Creator to that which he creates – the world.  The movement is good and simple 
because, precisely, there is: 
•  no reciprocity 
•  no reflection or reflexion back from the World to the Creator 
•  no breaking of the rules of the Theory of Types 
•  no problematic of the preface (to which we alluded at the outset) 
•  no paradox of the inclusion of what is to be defined within that which does the 
defining 
•  no  transcendental relationship 
                                             
14 op cit 117, B112-113 Hypothesis and Community a paper by Tim Gough 
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As Kant says, in the relation of cause and effect, and in the relation of the creator to the 
world, there is the mere relation of ground to consequence; there is no reciprocal relation 
back whereby the consequence affects the ground.  That, after all, is clearly the meaning of 
God, the Godhead, the one who can say (as in the Old Testament):  I am who I am.  The 
meaning of “God” is: the one who is pure ground, and not consequence. 
 
But conversely, the consequence of this is as follows: 
•  whenever we attempt to apply a logic of cause and effect; whenever we attempt 
a hypothetical judgement, we are placing ourselves in the position of God 
 
and, further: 
•  whenever we attempt to apply the hypothetical judgement of cause and effect, 
we are placing ourselves outside the milieu of that of which we are making a 
judgement.  This follows from Kant’s point that God and the World do not 
together make a whole; unlike disjunctive judgements of Community and 
reciprocity, which operate within whole realms, the relation of cause and effect 
effects a radical split between the two parts of the judgements and places them in 
entirely different worlds, since the consequence perforce does not return to affect 
(or effect) the ground 
 
In the light of this, the claims I wish to posit here, for architectural thought, are as follows: 
•  a strong definition of experimental science – in whatever field this science will 
operate – starts from the causal relation.  What the experiment aims to do, 
primarily, is to separate out the consequence from the ground in order to ensure 
that the consequence can on no account reciprocally affect the ground.  As soon 
as that happens, we no longer have an experiment, strongly defined.  This can be 
inductively verified, for instance, if we consider the nature of drug testing, where 
the double blind statistical experiment ensures that the expectations of both the 
patient and the doctor do not reciprocate back onto either of them and thereby 
affect the outcome
15.  But we can also verify it in any other realm of human 
thought which has taken the natural sciences as its model.  For instance, art or 
architectural history, which were established by positing a set of objects of study 
(works of art or architecture) in such a way that the studying was essentially 
experimental in nature; that is, non-reciprocal, non-communal, in the sense that 
the study of the object would never come, of itself, to reciprocate back onto that 
object and affect (or effect) its character 
•  by contrast, thinking about architecture per se can never constructively occur 
within the hypothetical field of cause and effect.  Architecture is essentially 
concerned not with an analog of the relationship between God and the World, but 
is rather concerned with a whole within which there are reciprocal and communal 
relations.  Always, within any thought of architecture, within any discussion 
which wishes to remain faithful to its intrinsic nature, there will be a reciprocal 
relation between that which is to be thought about and that which does the 
thinking.  This applies not only in circumstances where we wish to discuss, say, 
the poetic nature of our discipline – a circumstance where this reciprocity may 
perhaps easily be granted.  It also obtains in circumstances where we wish to 
discuss topics regarded as technological or scientific in nature.  As an example: 
issues surrounding sustainability are most often framed merely in terms of the 
qualities of the objects making up buildings (eg a certain quantity of insulation; a 
certain capacity for on-site carbon-neutral energy generation) as if the solution to 
these physical problems is the solution to sustainability.  In fact, the issues of 
 
15 thus the double blind experiment can never come to terms with the placebo effect, which is precisely not an 
effect (in Kantian terms) by reciprocation or relation of community.  We might say, therefore, that if medical science 
insists on maintaining the cause and effect relationship as its standard of explanation, then such phenomena as 
placebo (including homeopathy, which from its history is clearly related to the placebo effect – answering as it does 
the question: how can we implement the placebo effect when the trick is to engender faith in healing in the 
recipient?) will always slip from its grasp Hypothesis and Community a paper by Tim Gough 
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sustainability must also be considered within the reciprocal and communal field 
which includes the community and persons who act with the physical objects 
which can be abstracted, if we wish, from the whole within which this reciprocity 
operates 
•  we would therefore, for architectural thought, need to reframe, in a different table 
of symptoms, the notion of experimentation.  We must think it outside the notion 
of cause and effect.  Perhaps, then, experimentation would come to be called 
something else: but the name does not matter.  Conversely, it is unhelpful to give 
architecture experimentation the name of “creation” if, for all that, we retain 
within this term the cause and effect relation of the Godhead to the isolated world 
it has created.  We must, in other words, destroy the notion of ground; yes, there 
are consequences; but, we may say analogously to Deleuze, there are only 
consequences endlessly circulating in a complex community of reciprocal relations 
 
Architecture thus thought is, I would posit, essentially eventful.  It is eventful because the 
event is the place where this complex community of reciprocal relations occurs.  And in this 
sense we can, to conclude, outline in brief another “table of symptoms” to which Deleuze 
points in Logic of Sense.  What he does in the second series of that “novel” is to outline a 
stoic disjunctive logic which, as he says, brings about “an entirely new cleavage of the 
causal relation”
16.  He posits, with the Stoics: 
•  on the one hand, bodies with their “physical qualities” and “the corresponding states 
of affairs”
17, which have a relation of cause between each other.  The peculiarity of 
the stoic cleavage is that such bodies only have a causal relationship between each 
other; they have no relation of effect with each other 
•  what, then, do they cause, if not each other?  They cause, says Deleuze, things – 
non-beings, in fact – of an “entirely different nature”
18.  These non-beings are 
events, which in turn never have a relationship of cause either amongst themselves 
or with bodies 
 
Now in citing, briefly, this other cleavage of the causal relation my intention is not to mark a 
Deleuzian counter-point to Kant (as is often done) but rather to end without a conclusion 
regarding the experimental in architecture.  Kant’s notion of reciprocal relations, as 
contrasted to cause and effect, does not provide us with a definitive answer to the nature of 
architecture or the most appropriate way in which it may be thought.  It is merely one table 
of symptoms, one novel, which can be used eventfully.  There are other tables, too, such as 
the stoic one
19 which Deleuze describes; ones which operate according to a different 
register, and which cannot necessarily be reduced to the other or subsumed together under a 
common concept or unity.  This in turn, I would suggest, points to another possibility for 
experimentation beyond the thought of “the one”, beyond the thought of identity and unity; 
and it may indeed be that the disavowal of “the one” is the locus of a truly experimental 
experiment. 
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16 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 6 
17 op cit 4 
18 ibid 
19 or indeed the Epicurean one, which also formulates “another cleavage of causality”, op cit 6 